Theory of interpretation and rights
Introduction
THEORY OF LAW AND THEORY OF INTERPRETATION: AN APPROACH. There are talk of the seventies, in the history of law two publications emerged, on the one hand, Ronald Dworkin’s attack on legal positivism and the immediate appearance in 1978, these works nicknametime is considered to reconcile the legal positivism crisis and the rise of a theory of a legal but more renewed argumentation. Non -main moral positivism Dworkin expands the theory of right so much to be looking for and does so in the form of legal argumentation.
Developing
It was the moment where the question began to ask. What are the between the theory of argumentation and theory of law? In an essay that I perform in Prof. Manuel Atienza happens to talk about the theory of argumentation and gives a newer point and not with the positivism bases. Its naturalism and realism update. Judicial discretion between theories. It is concluded that a legal reasoning theory demands and is demanded by the theory of law and it is clarified that no one will be allowed to take advantage of their own fraud.
When the legal system is insufficient to resolve a case and the exercise of these discretions requests a normative theory of legal argumentation. According to their concepts, the main non -positivism marks a new direction for the theory of law in two aspects: – structurally, – substantively. Teaj Law Theory. As we know the Teaj is an applicability analysis and not psychological analysis, when we talk about justification we will relate it to the application of law.
As the application of a norm is known, it must be involved by the justification of it, but to justify we must know the concept of it and we can say that justification is to adduce reasons, but these reasons can be diverse by which there are 3 justificationsIMPORTANT AS THEY ARE: JUSTIFICATION Sensu Largissimo This consists of giving a reason that covers descriptive statements in the same way to the same norm;Long sensu justification: It consists of giving favorable reasons to a normative statement according to the system.
Sensu Stricto justification: You must give favorable reasons to regulations from your system justifies correct thorium. We will now address the issue of judicial decisions and in these different types of premises are found: descriptive premises corresponds to the principle of empirical science involved in the theories of truth and judicial issues such as the classification of facts and evidence and evidence. Normative premises in this we find two types that are systematic and extrarasystematic.
Which the first tells us that they are all those that are identified by rule, that is, the justification of these unnecessary premises and are extra -systematic premises are those that do not appear in reasoning because they are considered obvious. Robert Alexy theory. For citizenship it is not in accordance only legality but justice as for many of the jurists, but all based on the morality of the decisions of the judges to which they bet on the internal point of view, for Robert Alexy the legal discourse is aSpecial case for general practical speech.
conclusion
His colleagues as Neil Mac Cormick believes that he presents legal reasoning as a kind of practical reasoning, so these are successive claims TCE whose formulations could say that legal reasoning is a special case of moral reasoning, but TCE are not very formulationsaccurate for two things, for not knowing if they are regulations or descriptive and a relationship to what morality is spoken.
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