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The subject before the moral law
According to Kant, the moral law itself is moral conscience because it is the fact of reason, something that only the human being has as finite rational subjects. Kant explains:
In the practical domain there is nothing prior to this fact, from what we could derive this awareness: nor from another idea of pure reason, such as freedom (because we do not have an immediate awareness of this as a positive concept);nor from an empirical fact, obviously, because from any data of the experience a law can be derived as such.
It has become accustomed to estimating that Kant’s formulation on the fundamental principle of practical reason, the categorical imperative domain, would serve as a supreme principle from which it would be used to derive or deduct in a clean and systematic way, all rules of conduct (maximum moral);and that having the possession of said correct maxims, they would apply to all the actions that fall on said maximum. On the one hand, this assumption is partially wrong;The fundamental practical principle requires that only the maximum of the actions can always be worth as a "universal legislation", which inevitably implies a kind of assumption of full effective rule, I mean, it means putting in parentheses the value of the maximumAs orienting principles of the action. On the other hand, Faktum’s thesis covers how that awareness of the law conforms to the fact and influences the subject from the point of view of its receptivity regarding the law, and this also originally.
Indeed, being aware of the law necessarily implies a way of being affected on the occasion of it (we do not say for it), and this way of being affected is an essential part of the fact that Kant wants to highlight. Indeed, the imperative character that moral law has is only due to our finite character: as rational and at the same time sensitive beings, the resistance exerted by moral law regarding our desires is also a kind of fact, it will be contrasted, we would say, of the mere positive awareness of the law (if there is something like that). In what follows, we will briefly examine what Kant argues regarding the awareness of the law under discussion with some recent interpretations, and we will examine from these interpretations both the suspensive moment of the guiding function of the maxims and the possible linking of this consciencewith a peculiar way of feeling that would express our original inadequacy before the law and therefore some suspension of the usual practical identity of the moral agent.
The originality of Schönecker’s interpretation lies in how he understands the faktum of reason. Schönecker attributes radical importance to moral feelings, to the point of maintaining that Kant is a moral intuitionist. Moral intuitionism, says Schönecker, would defend the thesis that “the validity of the moral law or the value of certain goods is something known directly through feelings. Kant would be a moral intuitionist at least in relation to the validity of moral law ”. Without a doubt, it is a particularly risky thesis. Schönecker is not saying, in any case, that we have a primarily intuitive knowledge of the categorical imperative, which Kant expressly denies. He refers to the understanding of the moral law to which the Faktum refers is not the understanding of a skeptic or an anti-realistic who understands the content of the principle without believing in it;It would be, on the contrary, an understanding of the moral law as a principle that links the agent in a specific way in which it is submitted to moral law. Now, what makes possible our binding understanding of the validity and purity of moral law is, according to Schönecker, precisely the feeling of respect, which, he says, "works as a justification for the moral principle".
Certainly Schönecker does not deny that the awareness of the moral law is carried out strictly for reason itself, but adds that this conscience must be accompanied by the feeling of respect, precisely to explain the self-coercive aspect experienced by the agent beforesaid law.
The objective law of morality
To be able to talk about the objective of morality, we have to know that there are norms in human behavior, which at the time of naturally performing the group of moral rules, it is called objective morality, since these rules are as social facts regardless of whether an individual wishesabide by them or not.
Human wisdom is able to find that the objective rule of morality is born from being and the demands of the ultimate end of the human individual and, therefore, of good as transcendental property of being. The moral rule is the rule or measure by which we have the possibility of discerning the goodness or objective evil of a human act. Human wisdom captures this order from objective evidence due to which a human act is not formally moral (good or bad) but in the size in which the goodness or objective evil is taken by wisdom, since only to that extent is freelyestimated and then it is a human act. However, as it is the intelligence of the human individual, which captures or discovers the objective rule, there is also a subjective rule of wisdom that is the moral conscience that judges in functionality of the moral objective rule or from which wisdom presents it as true andOkay
In the parts of the universe, each creature is by its own act and perfection. Second, however, the lower creatures are because of the noblest and each of the creatures is for the perfection of the entire universe. Finally, the whole universe, with each of its parts, is ordered to God as the end, as the divine goodness is reflected in them by some imitation for the glory of God.
For Saint Thomas, nature is the manifestation of the order with which God leads things to his own objectives and towards himself as his last end. For that reason, for him, irrational beings glorify precisely to God, since the right laws act according to their nature, in their conservation, in their ontological development and also obey the laws of their species in the use that other entities make of those entities makebeings to those who remain naturally subordinate.
A second fundamental point of metaphysical inquiry, is based on the fact that the primary allusion for the decision and assessment of the rule should be the voluntary act to which it is ordered and, more than anything, to the especially human good that is the formal object ofthe will.