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The Roman Republic and the fall of Julio César
Near the end of the second century before Christ, however, the system began to break down. Politicians began to push the limits of acceptable behavior: violence entered the sand of domestic politics. (This long disintegration process, completed a century later by Augustus, has been called by modern scholars the "Roman Revolution").
At the time of César’s domination in 49-44 D.C., The Republic had not been functioning effectively in the previous years. Politics has come to be dominated by violence and intimidation;The accounts are resolved with sticks and dagas instead of speeches and persuasions. Powerful general at the head of politicized armies extorted the State more and more power for them and their supporters. When legal methods were inappropriate, the generals occasionally resorted to open rebellion. The intimidation of the Senate through the use of camping armies near Rome or veterans brought to the city to influence the electoral assemblies was also effective and was used regularly as a political tactic from Ca. 100 d.C.
These generals also used their provincial commands to extract money from the premises as a way to finance their national political ambitions. While the conflict in the state continued, the popular assemblies, the only way for the approval of binding laws in the Roman Republic, routinely ended in disorder and disturbances.
The senatorial aristocracy, divided by internal disputes, proved to be unable to deal effectively with the increasing disorder, but the alternative, the monarchy, was not openly proposed by anyone. When the civil war broke out between Pompey and César in 49 D.C., few could have been surprised. These two men were the strongest personalities of the State, each in command of important military forces, and were mutually antagonistic. Despite defeating their opponents in the long series of civil wars between 49 and 45 d.C., César did little to deal with the underlying evils of the Republic. His concerns were first of all the defeat in the field of his political opponents.
During these years, and after his final victory, he was content to maintain control by a combination of the consultation and the reactivated, although vilified, dicta-dura. Extensive and excessive honors of all kinds were also voted for Caesar by a flattering Senate: he did not reject any, except attempts to crown him king. However, its wide contempt for tradition and precedents, and the general air of arrogance and arrogance that marked César’s deals with their peers, made him appear as the king of Rome in anything but name. Undoubtedly, he approved several laws that deal with immediate projects (for example, debt or calendar relief), but did not make any serious effort to systematize their position or address the issues that had generated the Roman revolution.
In fact, in the last months of his life he planned to leave Rome for several years to campaign against births in the east. That the group of nobles who conspired to kill César included unhappy members of his own party constitutes a forceful testimony of the effects of César’s lack of touch.
March 15, 44 to.C., C. Julio César, a life dictator, was surrounded by the conspirators in a Senate meeting and killed with twenty-three stabs.