Mexico foreign policy: scope and limits
The scope and limits of Mexico’s international policy
Since the nineteenth century, Mexico fought against Spain for the independence of it, it was invaded by France and partially annexed by the United States. But the country’s problems were not caused only by external factors. After obtaining independence, he descended to the civil war and, at the beginning of the 20th century, numerous revolutions threatened to destabilize the country. Foreign powers often took sides in these struggles. Therefore, Mexico has repeatedly felt the frustration of being subjugated by foreign governments and fighting to obtain international recognition.
The Mexican State has gathered a lot of historical experiences that have shaped the national identity behind foreign policy. This historical development has had a great impact on the professionalization of Mexican diplomacy. As such, Mexico’s foreign policy has historically been characterized by two permanent objectives: first of all, affirm sovereignty and identity; Secondly, seek economic and human resources to boost development, once a federal and republican government system has been consolidated. The identity, sovereignty and development marked the traditional vision of relations abroad in the name of national interest. There is no doubt that, throughout the history of Mexican foreign policy, the relationship with the United States has been a crucial factor in the formation of the national psyche. In view of these external threats, several Mexican leaders trusted the development of doctrines, with the aim of guaranteeing Mexican sovereignty in the context of great inequality between nations, where the power of force had priority over any international legal statute.
During the 1960s, the United States intelligence officers in communications to their supervisors in Washington, DC regretted that the political situation in Mexico was so complicated that it evaded an easy and safe understanding. These actors expressing frustration and uncertainty about the role of Mexico and communism. The ideology of protest movements that took place throughout the decade and the difficult logic of Mexico’s relationship with Cuba. This confusion was the result, among other things, of deeply different opinions that the two nations had of the cold war.
The world of the cold war was governed by the bipolarity established and applied by the United States and the Soviet Union. In this context, the superpowers were involved in a global struggle for nothing less than ‘the soul of humanity’, each of them promoting its own agendas for the improvement of all. For the United States, the way to progress is found in modernization through democratic capitalism, involving the poorest nations in the world in the international economy and raising the living conditions of their peoples. Conversely, the Soviet Union also advanced improvements in the quality of material life for the poor in the world, but through the communist system. Therefore, both superpowers had essentially the same broad agenda, but diametrically opposed ideologies that govern how to achieve it. However, in practice, their methods to achieve this goal were not so far, both implied the affirmation of their military and economic power over the weakest and poorest nations in the world.
His foreign policy actively allied with those considered friends and attacked those considered enemies, but did not abandon traditionally moralistic nuances. Mexicans and Latin Americans in general, on the other hand, had a much less critical vision of communism and were less likely to associate all communist things with the Soviet Union. As a result, Mexicans saw the cold war not as a crusade of principles, but as an example of aggression by imperialist states whose financial and military power allowed them to dominate less developed countries. However, neither Mexico nor any other Third World nation could escape the Cold War and its generalized influence, both in international affairs and in internal politics.
As the nature of Mexico’s state of dependency in relation to the United States became evident, and when Mexico was involved in a revolution in which this dependency would be a key issue, the relationship between the two neighbors became more complex. Cordial relations received with the United States became a political responsibility for Mexican officials in the country, but a virtual need abroad. Military, the United States dominated Mexico, the United States was the most important trade partner in Mexico and a long history of cross -border migration left the populations and interests of the two nations inexorably intertwined.
When the Cold War was in the beginning, Mexico’s anti -Americanism feeling evolved from expropriation issues, owned by the land and treatment of work to broader issues of national sovereignty, economic nationalism and anti -imperialism. In the 1960s, for the people on the Popular Front and communist organizations, the main enemy was once again imperialism, reduced to its slightest expression, the United States government. Among the Mexican population in general, most people preferred to remain neutral during the Cold War. Episodes such as the expropriation of oil in 1938 and the nationalization of the electricity grid in 1958 caused waves of anti -Americanism, as well as the Cuban revolution, the invasion of Bay of pigs and the death of Che Guevara. The popular criticism of the United States, its policies and everything it represented was increasing in the 1960s and was quite visible in the 1968 student movement.
Beyond the United States, the fault for the failed invasion of Cuba and the complicity in the death of Che Guevara, a more generalized criticism of the systemic place of the United States in the world had established itself in Mexico in the sixties. The Mexicans, particularly those on the political left, resented American domain in global affairs and influence in Mexico.
The development strategy with a view to Mexico. The Government promoted the development of consumer goods industries directed towards internal markets by imposing high protection tariffs and other barriers to imports. The proportion of total production derived from agriculture and other primary activities decreased during the same period, while the services remained constant. The Government promoted industrial expansion through public investment in agricultural, energy and transport infrastructure. Cities grew rapidly during these years, reflecting the change in the use of agriculture to industry and services. The urban population increased at a high rate after 1940. The growth of urban labor even exceeded the growth rate of industrial employment, and surplus workers took poorly paid service work.
Echeverría traveled widely defending radical causes of the Third World and blamed the ‘north’ industrial for the problems of the impoverished south ’. Echeverría established diplomatic relations with 62 more nations. Echeverría’s critics in Mexico pointed out that, in doing so, he was trying to earn the favor of as many countries as possible to fulfill his aspirations to obtain the Nobel Peace Prize and become Secretary General of the United Nations, but failed in both. In 1972, Echeverría got involved in the situation of Chile. After the international financial community stopped lending to Chile, he traveled to that country offered a line of credit to the socialist and anti-American P. Salvador Allende. In the same year, he even risked a wave of internal criticism for sending oil and wheat to Chile at a time when Mexico was not self-sufficient.
In 1973, after Allende’s overthrow, Echeverría refused to recognize the new Chilean government, broke diplomatic relations with Chile and welcomed a large number of leftist refugees in that country. This non -recognition of the new Chilean government, of course, was inconsistent with the principle of non -intervention. Foreign policy and national interests foreign policy in Mexico has national political points. This is particular. It is true when Mexico suffers a social, political or economic crisis. Any real or apparent foreign policy success diverts public attention from internal problems. Example: The meeting last November in Acapulco of eight Latin American presidents, convened by Mexico, to discuss the external debt of the regions. Although an important agreement was not reached, it gave Mexico the opportunity to show its solidarity with other Latin American countries. This issue is always well received by the Mexican public, especially by the ideological left of Mexico, which is a great power within the Institutional Revolutionary Party. While there is a tendency to blame Luis Echeverría for all or most of these developments, this forgets that the administration of it coincided with the first oil clash of the OPEC (1973) and the deterioration of external conditions. Mexico had not yet discovered oil reserves (1978) that should provide a temporary respite to the economic adjustment after the impact of weight devaluation, the first change in its value in more than 20 years. At the same time, external demand fell, mainly transmitted from the United States, the largest commercial partner of Mexico, where the economy had fallen in recession at the end of 1973.
However, it seems reasonable to conclude that the difficult international environment, although important for the miracle period came to an end. It was not helped by Echeverría’s propensity to demagogy, the loss of fiscal discipline that had long characterized government policy, at least since the fifties. The only question that should be resolved was what kind of conclusion would the period come. The answer, unfortunately, was disastrous.
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