Venice Merchant and Criminal Law
The perspective of criminal law leads us first to think that all men’s actions must and are punished by law, regardless of the infringement and to the extent that they do so. That is, we are undoubtedly in the face of a behavior that goes against the established legal order, but at this point we could ask what happens when a person is punished, sanctioned by the State’s apparatus, even exercising a right.
The case of Venice merchant allows us to raise this question with a clear example;We are facing the trial between the Jew and Antonio, who had requested a loan to the first one giving a pound of meat from his body as a guarantee. When he was taken to trial, the Jew, as was responsible for, claimed the payment of the acquired debt, after the deadline, and in view of the lack of payment by debtor, decided to take the guarantee garment offered. In the development of the story we can find many reasons why the Jew decided to collect his garment, even beyond the payment of money, among which we could mention revenge or simple whim as he expresses it;However, these are not legal reasons that compete to analyze for what we will focus on the following. Can a State, through its laws sanction or punish a person who had the right to act as the Jew did? Probably many are the possible theories in the face of this question, for this reason we will begin by saying whether or not, by the Jew, an acquired right.
We observe that, in the development of the trial, the Jew is granted the collection of the garment given in guarantee, a pound of flesh of Antonio, in the area closest to the heart. Then we find that it is arrested by the lawyer warning that the letter consigned in what we could consider a contract or title value, did not include Antonio’s blood, which is why he had to take the meat that belonged to him without spilling a single drop of blood. At this point we could ask if a crime is really configured against the integrity of a person, even if it has granted their consent. We could say that such a conduit lacks antijuricity, since the Jew’s action was endorscrime configuration. In the same way we could state that the behavior is guilty, even painful, since there was a clear intention by the Jew to cut, near the heart of Antonio. Then we analyze that the Jew’s conduct is questioned by Venetian laws, warning that a foreigner, directly or indirectly, threatens the life of a Venice inhabitant, will be subject to justice. At this point we can find two very clear positions;The first is whether the laws can condemn a person for acting in accordance with the law, that is, the same law and the State, allowed the Jew to take a pound of Antonio’s flesh;On the other hand, we find that an unlawful and fully guilty behavior is typified.
Within what we have mentioned so far we could find that there is a slight contradiction of the norm, it should be clarified that the Jew acted in the right to want to cut Antonio’s flesh, not because a norm or law granted such a right directly, but because asWe know well and in this particular case, the contract is law for the parties. In this sense, if there is a slight contradiction between the norms, we could ask ourselves if, after the Jew is condemned for his action, a fundamental principle of criminal law such as in Dubio Pro reo would be overlooked.
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