Studying The Essay By Susan Wolf

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Studying the essay by Susan Wolf

"I’m glad," wrote the acclaimed American philosopher Susan Wolf, ‘that neither those who care the most’ are ‘Santos Morales’. This statement is one of the initial comments of a historical essay in which Wolf imagines what would be morally. If it is involved in Wolf’s thinking experiment, and the conclusions he takes from him, then he will find that he offers the release of the trap of moral perfection.

The Wolf ‘Santos Morales’ essay imagines two different models of the moral saint, which she labels as the holy loving and the rational saint. The holy loving, as Wolf describes, does what is morally better in a cheerful spirit: such a life is not fun of fun, but it is infallibly and unwaverably focused on morality. We must think of the holy loving as the type of person who happily sells all his possessions to donate the raised to the relief of the famine. The rational saint is equally devoted to moral causes, but is not motivated by a spirit of constant love, but by a sense of duty.

The holy loving can be more fun than the rational saint, or more crazy, depending on his personal temperament. Would the constant happiness of the holy lover make it easier to be with her, or would it take you to the curve? There is an instruction associated with Buddhism – in fact, coined by the American scholar Joseph Campbell – who asks you to ‘participate happily in the sentences of the world’, and the Holy Lover does it to the fullest: but perhaps you would find such a sustained joy before the worsthorrors of the inane or inappropriate world. On the other hand, the rational saint, with its relentless commitment to duty, could also be a very pleasant company.

Both types of moral saints can present difficulties if you yourself are not a saint. Would they constantly bother you and urge you to give more? Maybe they have joined the effective altruistic movement, and are repeatedly suggesting the most effective forms in which you can use your time and income available to help. How does such a person feel when you dedicate much of your free time and attention not to study but to video games? And when do you dedicate a considerable part of your income to luxuries such as wine and chocolate instead of providing others with basic nutrition? Do you want to be a friend of someone whose 100% moral approach always seems to encourage you to feel guilty?

The aspiration to be a moral saint, Wolf suggests, could turn someone into a nightmare to live and be close. British writer Nick Hornby offers a comic version of this stage in his novel how to be good (2001). But maybe a true saint, being a person as decent as possible, would not want you to feel bad all the time: what would that good? In fact, the true Morales saints would not be as sensitive about their effect on your life as they are on its effect on the world in general? Wolf suggests that the problem then would be that the Holy Moral would have to hide its true thoughts about your degree of moral commitment. In addition, can a moral holy sincerely laugh at your cynical jokes when they go, as Wolf says, against morality? And, in any case, when would they have time to go with you? If they are morally perfect, then they have much more important things to do.

It is not just friends who do not fit into a life dedicated to the maximum moral achievement. Can the Moral Saint, if perfect, "waste" time watching movies and television? What if you spend some money at good food or on trips? Or spend energy on sport instead of seriously important causes? Or go observe birds or hiking? There is no time for theater or pleasure to curl up with a good book. The problem with extreme altruism, as Oscar Wilde said about socialism, is that it occupies too many afternoons. The Morales saints could find time for some of these activities when they coincide with their ethical projects: see sport, for example, in a collection of charity funds;or admire the landscape on the way to a conflictive point that needs help. But these experiences must be seen as lucky extras if the only objective in life is to do as much moral and possible.

If you do not have enough time for friendship or fun, or works of art or wildlife, then you are missing what Wolf calls the non -moral part of life. Wolf does not want to suggest that the immoral is equal to the immoral: just because something has nothing to do with morality (playing tennis, for example) does not mean that it is morally bad. The point is that morality focuses, intuitively, on matters such as treating others equally, and trying to relieve suffering. And these are good things: but it is also the holidays with a friend, or explore the tropical jungle of Alaska, or enjoy a curry. Moral goodness is only one aspect of the good things in life and, if you live as if the moral aspect were the only aspect that matters, then you are likely to be a lot of impoverish in terms of the non -moral goods of your life. And that means getting lost a lot.

Wolf imagines Holy Love as perfectly happy to live a life in which non -moral goods do not play any role. Ultra-scientific moral life-without friendships, no hobbies, or ethical distractions-does not have a cost for holy love in terms of satisfaction. But Wolf wonders how this can be. Do not see Holy Love as much as being lost and, if so, how can this not affect your happiness? Perhaps, Wolf suggests that Holy Love is almost lacking a piece of the perceptual team: the ability to see that there is more in life than morality. Maybe this explains why holy love can remain happy. On the contrary, Wolf does not assume that the rational saint does not see that there is a great area of life that is being lost. Wolf imagines the Holy Rational by persisting in her sterile life only for the sense of duty. But why go so far as to live an entire life and exclusively dedicated to moral causes? Wolf suggests responses that make the rational holy look so rational after all: perhaps self-od and/or a pathological fear of condemnation.

The two Wolf versions of moral holiness are modeled in the two most influential moral philosophies of modern Western philosophy: utilitarianism (which inspires Wolf’s loving saint) and Kantianism (which inspires the rational saint). What would your life be like, wolf wonders, if you lived these moral visions of the world to the maximum? Wolf suggests that neither of the two visions of the world, if they live in an integral way, offer a very attractive life: each one, as we have seen, produces a vision of the good life that consists so completely in devotion to the needs of theothers that there is no time for the personal enjoyment of the many good non -moral things of life – there is no time, in fact, for their own life. You would spend your whole existence, to echo some words by Bernard Williams, as a moral system server.

It is a significant characteristic of both utilitarianism and Kantianism that neither of them values personal happiness, if it values it. Utilitarianism is a philosophy of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ and thus, if the needs of many require that you make enormous personal sacrifices, including the sacrifice of your happiness, so it is. Wolf correctly imagines the perfect utilitarian, the Holy Love, as a happy person: and in fact that would be ideal. But no one should become a utilitarian for reasons of their own personal happiness or well -being: that is not the point of utilitarian morality. His individual happiness, considered in the context of billions of conscious lives, is only a drop in the ocean. If doing the right thing for the general good, for example, selling its main assets and dedicating the profits to charitable actions, it would make it unhappy, it is a penalty, but its unhappiness does not prevent the right thing.

Kantian morality is even less concerned about personal happiness. Kantianism, derived and appointed in honor of the 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant, is a philosophy that emphasizes our rational responsibility for other rational beings (hence the ‘Rational Holy’ label of Wolf). The reason to do the right thing is because it is your duty with others, not because it makes you happy. If other rational beings need our help – if they are hungry or oppressed, for example – then we owe them, just as they owe it to us if the positions are invested. Kant thought that being moral made you worthy of happiness, but that was all that allowed. One suspects that if he had lived to hear it, Kant would have liked the comment attributed to the Austrian philosopher of the 20th century Ludwig Wittgenstein: I don’t know why we are here, but I’m sure it’s not to have fun.

If modern moral theories, followed as ideals, produce unattractive visions of life, then one might think that something is wrong with the theories themselves. Maybe what is needed is a more complete conception of good life. In fact, one could believe that it is a sign that things have gone bad in terms of modern morality that the expression ‘the good life’ has become ambiguous. The expression is ambiguous because you have to wonder: do you mean with ‘good life’ morally good life or the most desirable life? The first may evoke images of serving the poor, and the second images of attending a champagne glass. Morally good life has been identified with a life of selfless altruism and the most desirable life with a life of pleasure search focused on oneself. The good life has therefore divided into two opposite directions, and the huge resulting schism seems to be a reason for concern.

These reflections, among others, could send us in the direction of the ethics of the virtue of ancient Greece in search of views prior to the schism. Many of the most famous philosophers of the time, among which Aristotle highof others, but would not require an impartial dedication to the needs of strangers. Ethics cares more about the question of how to be a good friend than for the question of how to save the world. And, as in the case of good friends, ethics is good for you and other people. In the heart of Aristotle’s ethics is the last win-win. The best ethical life is simply the most desirable, and the realization of our social nature is to live in mutual happiness with others. Ancient views like those of Aristotle make the schism between morality and personal happiness inconceivable.

Wolf, describing moral holiness in unattractive terms, could be easily misunderstood as a stimulus to return to views like that of Aristotle. But a careful reading of ‘Santos Morales’ makes it clear that Wolf does not have that intention. The fact that modern morality has evolved to include extensive responsibilities towards strangers is not something that Wolf wishes to undo. He is content to leave the concept of modern morality as it is: strongly altruistic, impartial and global in his reach. It is quite correct that morality concerns the lives of strangers to thousands of kilometers away and that, in regard to morality, the value of the life of a stranger is equal to that of one of their loved ones.

Wolf sees that, given the terrible state of the world, this leaves so much moral work for making one completely consuming the life of one. One could become, or aspire to become, a saint moral. But this is not a reason, for Wolf, to reject modern morality. What does believe that it is that you have to trace a line between what is morally required of one and what is morally liable but not morally required (what philosophers sometimes call the supererogatory). Morality does not force you to become a saint moral. Morality does not require that you do not have other interests in addition to morality. You have a life. Having a life does not mean that you do not take morale seriously or have given up trying to be a decent person.

It is a trap to think that choosing not being a saint automatically means that you have to be a sinner. And this has a moral point: to reject the idea that you should aspire to obtain a 10/10 score in morality is not an excuse for a low score. In ‘Santos Morales’, Wolf offers criticism of moral holiness that is also, once well understood, a defense of morality. She has developed a convincing case to reject a way of life guided only by moral demands, but this does not mean that she wants to throw the moral baby with the water of the saints of the saints.

A constant theme in Wolf’s philosophy is that it is not the wisest idea to look in moral theories to find ideals understanding how to live. Moral concepts mark very important areas of life, but they don’t tell us everything about life or how to live it. Therefore, it is not a criticism of a moral theory that life is not very attractive if we transform the theory into question into our only answer to the questions of life. That would be misunderstanding the role of a moral theory. Wolf, by putting moral theory in place, wants to free moral philosophy from its excessive moralism. We can inspire us on how to live for all kinds of sources: a lover we met online, a neighbor, a character of a television series, a poetry line.

Wolf is particularly interested in leaving space for individual interests and passions to shape his life, and think that the meaning of life is unlikely to come from morality as such. In part, this is because the meaning often comes from the commitment to their loved ones, and on numerous occasions their commitment to the family and friends will advance to its commitment to do what would be morally ideal. Let’s take an example of a recent psychological study conducted by researchers from Oxford and Yale: if you are committed to your grandson, then you could give you money to fix your car before helping a charity dedicated to the fight against malaria, even if you doThe latter would do rather. The fact that you are not morally perfect does not make you a bad person. You can be ‘perfectly wonderful’, as Wolf says, ‘without being perfectly moral’.

You can make meaning to life from a specific moral cause – working to prevent the lack of home, for example – but that is different from trying to make sense by making what is morally ideal on each occasion. In fact, the individual nature of your life is given by its concrete combination of relationships, passions and interests. Wolf, against the current of a lot of popular philosophical thinking, maintains the opinion that the meaning of life depends on spending your life absorbed in activities that are objectively good. The meaning of life arises, as Wolf says in a brilliant slogan, ‘when the subjective attraction meets the objective attraction …’ But the objective goods that typically make sense are, according to Wolf, the non -moral goods of which lifeof a saint moral would be so lacking: love relationships (including friendships), commitment to the natural world, love for fine arts or great sport, and so on.   

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