Reforms for the Constitution
Introduction
Power seeks reciprocity;in which it is a relationship between people or a group of people: the one who sends ‘and the one who obeys. It is a social force that produces command and obedience relationships;in which he empowers an active subject to control the behavior of the taxpayer, becoming obeying. Disorianizing power with pure command or with pure obedience is equivalent to allowing apparent idealizations, since power is, in any case, a command and obedience complex;It is characterized by bipolarity that appears in the relationship between the active element of those who send and the liability of those who obey.
Developing
The relationship between command and obedience is not manifested as a pyramidal structure, which is related to the leader located in the vertex with the conglomerate of followers by mediation of an "elite" the political power directly deployed by the State is, without a doubt, inThe current moment, an institutionalized power, that is, a power subject to operational norms, impersonal behavior patterns, or to put it in a pleasant way to sociologists, to "social roles". But the State is nothing more than the abstract support of organized political power, vivified by the social forces that press on it.
And they guide him in his mission of carrying out a dynamic political order, carriers of a non -state political power that can be not institutionalized, but acts on the state bodies and aspires to obtain the support of organized coercion that the monopoly. In this sense, it can be said that political power, at least in power, is a state power. Legitimacy implies a popular belief in the social value of existing institutions and in the ability of the regime to ensure the maintenance of this belief;that is, it relies on an authentic social belief on the validity of power,
What is equivalent, as Fernández Miranda states, to an interpretation of the reality that receives the free and voluntary adhesion of the people. This is precisely the consent that shows the link that unites the people with the government and that proves the legitimacy of power. With this we do not intend to affirm that consent is an indispensable condition of this legi ’timidad, we admit the existence of unseeled legitimate powers, but simply that it is a consequence of legitimate power. The problem of the legitimacy of power is prior to the achievement of adhesion that shows it.
Burdeau is clearly expressed in this regard: «Consent does not found the power of law;intervenes to ratify, not to create. Consent is to accept, not master. Is to admit the legitimacy of a domination, not have the mastery of an activity. Is to recognize the good basis of its aims and the opportunity of its media.»The constitutional reform procedure is regulated in Title X of the Constitution. The reform is, above all, an instrument of guarantee of the Constitution. An instrument that allows to ensure its continuity through its adaptation to social changes in the regional state.
Autonomous communities must have the possibility of raising constitutional reform. Moreover, it seems that the forecast is insufficient and that, at least, it would be necessary. It has been evidenced how the instrumentalization of reform mechanisms can affect the essential elements of the Constitution, configuring a violation of the competence limits of the reform body. Although the need to allow the adaptation of the Constitution to the demands of the moment is notorious.
No less true is that these mechanisms must be used for their legitimate purpose;Adapt is not destroy, after all. The use of logical schemes allowed us. Case different from the alterations derived from the use of non-formal mechanisms, such as mutation or constitutional elusion, these for their very informality could not be schematized in a logical-formal system. Finally, it must be insisted that the effects on the implicit material limits of these constitutional alterations.
They must be considered unlawful, which has been developed deep and accurate by the Colombian Constitutional Court in the doctrine of unconstitutionality by substitution. The challenge will be in the future to establish the legal sanction to the other forms of alterations to guarantee the stability and respect of the Constitution and that it can display its claim of dignification of man. It is necessary to leave in the end the direct appointment of George Orwell, of his work, rebellion on the farm, which remains not only as a reflection, but of invitation for the exercise of a responsible participatory democracy and that links all sectorsof the society.
In Colombia, the 1991 Political Constitution became an element of great meaning for the redefinition attempts of the State model and the national political regime. Liberated the bonds of formal legalistic discourse, the country began a new period of its republican development, the constituent Colombia, whose duration continues to be uncertain. Throughout the almost fourteen years since the consecration of the new letter, the structural instability of the country has not only been political, social and economic but, to a large extent, institutional. The democratic progression model defined as the social state of law.
Implicit and explicit in much of the extensive articulated of this new law of laws, it has not been able to avoid the constant obstacle to the achievement of a tangible institutional change in the short-median term. There have been two the main disturbing factors of the successful concretion of this new project. In the first extent, there is the set of individual and collective actors that for ideological, doctrinal, economic and instrumentalist reasons have interfered from different circumstances this aspiration. Among others, it is a political sector clinging to tax models around the old Constitution of 1886.
The capitalists at ultranza whose utilitarian vision does not yet become aware of the prevailing social asymmetry;The illegal armed actors whose marginalization of these institutional change processes has not been overPresident Uribe to open a negotiation space to paramilitary groups;and, also, the purists of law and economics who have prioritized their inflexible vision.
Tied to the fundamentalism of their disciplines that prevents them from venturing themselves in the search for the reduction of the gap between models and laws, on the one hand, and the recognition of the drastic structural changes, on the other. Second, a set of subjective and intangible elements persists around the lack of a political culture with a responsible and participatory citizen base, whose actions contrast with the roots of the exclusive forms of traditional politics, such as clientelism andCorporativism. Throughout these years Colombia has lived the coexistence of opposite models although not completely exclusive to each other.
It is well known that the social-democratic foundations so present in much of the constitutional framework have been accompanied by the neoliberal logic formally welcomed in the country shortly before the consecration of the 1991 Charter. In the years subsequent to this approval fact, debates and clashes on the inconsistency between the positions wielded by the judges of the Constitutional Court have been constant by insisting on the need for the agreed normative principles not contradicting the different government measures,and the realistic position of economists about an increasingly precarious macroeconomics.
It is not possible to forget that when the new Constitution was approved, Colombia lived a stage of great optimism resulting from the supposed rupture of the bonds of centralism and traditional political exclusion. To this, a promising economic landscape was added based on the availability of energy resources, without ignoring the uniqueness of the country’s growth in the "decade loss" that affected the development of the rest of Latin America so much. The Political Charter is determined by its guarantee character, especially in terms of social rights, but, given the demands for the realization of this type of rights and the current fiscal limitations of the Colombian State.
conclusion
There is a crossroads that force the gradual limitation of the scope of the Constitution itself. This transcends the economist debate and raises serious doubts about the future possibility of these institutional commitments, so democratically progressive speaking. The dilemma that the country is experiencing then around the options to maximize a function of social welfare and the event to clearly define the availability of more forceful projects to guarantee social rights. Also of the definition of an environment of economic viability that is not interfered with reasons such as the fiscal deficit, the overflow in public spending, the high external indebtedness.
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